Executive Summary : | The theory of quantum games is a mere extension of classical game theory in quantum framework. Major proposed games display a clear win for quantum players against classical ones. The reason for the better performance of quantum strategies was attributed to the weapon of entanglement or superposition of strategies that quantum mechanics offered to the quantum players. Just as quantum computing gives faster and efficient results in comparison to classical algorithms, quantum players in games out-shined their classical counterparts. Quantum games and quantum algorithms are being witnessed as similar concepts with varied outlook. Therefore, the discovery of novel quantum games is expected to pave way for comprehension and formulation of novel quantum algorithms, and hence lead to enhancement in quantum computational capacities. Moreover, Bayesian games, which are games with incomplete information have shown to possess direct correspondence with Bell-type inequalities that confirmed the presence of non-local correlations in a quantum state. The element of incompleteness in Bayesian games’ setting has a direct relation with the hidden variable model in quantum mechanically prepared particles. Thus, Bayesian games play an important role in representation of non-local correlations in quantum systems. The aim of our project is to develop understanding of quantum non-local correlations on these lines and demonstrate the usefulness of quantum strategies over their classical counterparts. Not only this, the idea of representing quantum cryptographic protocols, eavesdropping and cloning as games is emerging, with the aim of simpler understanding and analysis of these quantum mechanisms. The game-theoretic perspective of quantum key distribution and quantum secure direct communication protocols, has helped find mixed strategy Nash equilibrium strategies and payoffs of players (sender, receiver, and eavesdropper) involved in the communication protocol. This has motivated us to envisage other communication protocols as games, and thus evaluating stable equilibrium points for them. |